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Abstract 
 
This dissertation presents a collection of manuscripts that describe development of models 
and model implementation to analyze impact of potential A(H7N9) pandemic influenza outbreak 
in the U.S. Though this virus is still only animal-to-human transmittable, it has potential to become 
human-to-human transmittable and trigger a pandemic. This work is motivated by the negative 
impact on human lives that this virus has already caused in China, and is intended to support public 
health officials in preparing to protect U.S. population from a potential outbreak of pandemic scale.  
 An agent-based (AB) simulation model is used to replicate the social dynamics of the 
contacts between the infected and the susceptible individuals. The model updates at the end of 
each day the status of all individuals by estimating the infection probabilities. This considers the 
contact process and the contagiousness of the infected individuals given by the disease natural 
history of the virus. 
The model is implemented on sample outbreak scenarios in selected regions in the U.S. 
The sampling results are used to estimate disease burden for the whole U.S. The results are also 
used to examine the impact of various virus strengths as well as the efficacy of different 
intervention strategies in mitigating a pandemic burden. 
 This dissertation, also characterizes the infection time during a A(H7N9) influenza 
pandemic. Continuous distributions including exponential, Weibull, and lognormal are considered 
as possible candidates to model the infection time. Based on the negative likelihood, lognormal 
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distribution provides the best fit. Such characterization is important, as many critical questions 
about the pandemic impact can be answered from using the distribution. 
Finally, the dissertation focuses on assessing community preparedness to deal with 
pandemic outbreaks using resilience as a measure. Resilience considers the ability to recover 
quickly from a pandemic outbreak and is defined as a function of the percentage of healthy 
population at any time. 
The analysis, estimations, and metrics presented in this dissertation are new contributions 
to the literature and they offer helpful perspectives for the public health decision makers in 
preparing for a potential threat of A(H7N9) pandemic. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
A(H7N9) is a subtype of influenza A viruses that is found in birds including poultry. Since 
March of 2013, A(H7N9) has been found in several regions of China infecting humans, especially 
those who are in close contact with poultry either at farms or at markets dealing with poultry. So 
far, there has been four waves of infections in spring of 2013 and winters of 2013-14, 2014-15, 
and 2015-16. The fifth wave of infections is currently in progress. As of April 2017, a total of 1393 
laboratory-confirmed cases of A(H7N9) infections resulting in 534 deaths [1] have been recorded 
in several different regions of China spreading at least ten provinces and two municipalities. 
Additional cases are expected to have occurred in other regions, though have not yet been reported. 
It may be noted that the outbreaks have occurred in relatively densely populated regions of China 
that have over 54% of the country’s population. The average age of those infected in the first three 
waves is around 58 [2], and the majority of the infected had a high level of exposure to poultry 
(e.g., in live bird markets, and some commercial and backyard farms). The higher average age of 
the infected has not been attributed to the epidemiological features of A(H7N9). This virus is not 
considered to have acquired the ability to transmit among humans. 
From a public health preparedness standpoint, it is essential to assess the possible impact 
of a pandemic caused by the A(H7N9) virus, potential for which is considered to be high. Similar 
concerns for an impending pandemic were expressed by the public health community with another 
potent mutation of influenza virus H5N1 during years 2003-2009. Sporadic outbreaks of H5N1 
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during there years infected a total of 468 people in 15 countries causing 282 deaths [3]. This virus 
is also only animal-to-human transmittable. Till date, H5N1 has not acquired the ability to spread 
human-to-human infection and is still under surveillance. 
Researchers have closely examined the A(H7N9) infection scenarios in recent years and 
published their findings in several papers [4–10]. The findings include estimates of some of the 
epidemiological parameters. It is important to note that only symptomatic cases of A(H7N9) 
infections visited the doctor and were documented in the above official reports. It is difficult to 
assess the percentage of asymptomatic cases, but some researchers have estimated this value to be 
50% [11]. 
An important observation made so far about A(H7N9) is that, though it is highly pathogenic 
both in humans and birds, infected poultry remains asymptomatic. This makes it difficult to 
identify the spread of A(H7N9) among poultry. In recent years, the Chinese government has 
applied containment measures to limit the spread of A(H7N9) virus including culling birds in large 
numbers and closing live poultry-markets and trading areas [12].  
In our effort to assess impact of a pandemic from A(H7N9) virus, we used an updated 
version of our previously developed AB simulation model [13–15]. The simulation model 
replicates the dynamics of a given population during a pandemic outbreak by incorporating the 
demographic information (households, schools, workplaces, and communities), human behavior 
(including contacts, compliance to quarantine and other public health measures, and travel), 
epidemiological parameters of the virus (force of infection, incubation and latent periods, basic 
reproduction number, and fatality rate), and non-pharmaceutical intervention strategies for 
containment and mitigation. The AB model considers detailed information about the households 
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and their member compositions (age, sex, work, parental status), distance between individuals, 
their daily schedules, contact processes, infection process, and disease natural history. 
We assumed that during outbreaks, non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategies are 
used to contain virus spread. A NPI strategy comprises measures like isolation, quarantine, and 
school and workplace closures. Parameters defining these measures were chosen in our study 
based on recommendations found in [15]. Some of our AB simulation model features were adapted 
from the models presented in [11] and [15].  
 
1.2 Goals and Objectives 
The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the impact of a potential influenza pandemic 
outbreak caused by A(H7N9) virus in the U.S. This goal has been addressed through the following 
objectives. 
1. Improve an existing AB simulation model by incorporating a more detailed approach to 
estimate the probability of infection. 
2. Develop disease burden estimates from a potential A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak affecting 
the whole United States. 
3. Determine the probability distribution characterizing the infection time of a A(H7N9) 
pandemic outbreak. 
4. Assess community preparedness to face pandemic outbreaks using resilience measures. 
 
Objective 1 was achieved by incorporating in an existing simulation model a detailed 
approach from the literature [11] to estimate the force of infection, a key input to evaluate the 
probability of infection of a susceptible individual. This updated version of the model was first 
validated using information from a simulated outbreak in Thailand presented in [11]. Objectives 1 
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and 2 are considered in the manuscript discussed in Chapter 2. Objective 3 was achieved by 
analyzing typical continuous distributions using the negative log likelihood as a decision criteria 
(see Chapter 3). Objective 4 was addressed by developing resilience measures and evaluating the 
measures for different virus strengths and intervention strategies. Details of these measures are 
presented in Chapter 4.  
 
1.3 Summary of Manuscripts 
The first manuscript estimates the disease burden of a potential A(H7N9) influenza 
pandemic in the U.S. using an agent-based (AB) simulation model. This AB model has an inherent 
capacity limitation of simulating only up to five million people. This limitation is attributed to the 
limited memory availability in standard desktop computers and to the nature of memory usage by 
the AB model. To work within this limitation, we used a procedure that divides the U.S. in clusters 
using the number and the density of urban population as predictors. Within each cluster, a subset 
of states were selected to simulate independent pandemic outbreaks. If a selected state had an urban 
population below five million, the model considered all urban regions for the simulated outbreak; 
else, only selected contiguous counties within the state with up to five million people were 
considered as the outbreak region. The results from the sample states were integrated using a 
sampling approach, and burden estimates were calculated for each cluster. Results for the clusters 
were used to obtain estimates for the whole U.S. Infection attack rates (IARs) for transmission 
scenarios with R0=1.5 and 1.8 (with 95% C.I.) were found to be 18.78% (17.3-20.27) and 25.05% 
(23.11-26.99), respectively. 
The second manuscript examines the probability distribution that characterizes the 
infection time for a potential A(H7N9) influenza pandemic outbreak. The data needed for this was 
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obtained by implementing an AB simulation model on three different scenarios of transmissibility 
of the A(H7N9) virus. Common continuous probability distributions were analyzed and it was 
concluded, based on the negative log-likelihood, that the lognormal distribution provides a good 
fit.  
The third manuscript first presents a resilience measure that can de used to assess 
community preparedness. It then considers an A(H7N9) influenza pandemic outbreak and 
evaluates the community resilience measures for three different transmissibility scenarios with and 
without NPIs.  
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Chapter 2:  Estimating Disease Burden of a Potential A(H7N9) Pandemic Influenza 
Outbreak in the United States 
 
 The complete article Estimating Disease Burden of a Potential A(H7N9) Pandemic 
Influenza Outbreak in the United States (submitted to BMC Public Health) can be found in 
Appendix B.  
 
2.1 Abstract 
Since spring 2013, periodic emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China has 
heightened concerns for a possible pandemic outbreak though it is believed that the virus is not yet 
human-to-human transmittable. Till June 2016, A(H7N9) has resulted in 781 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of human infections causing 313 deaths (40% fatality rate). This paper presents disease 
burden estimates from a potential A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak throughout the United States. 
Estimation method uses a machine learning technique to divide 50 states into three clusters based 
on urban population size and density, and thereafter employs an agent based (AB) model to 
simulate outbreaks in selected states from each cluster. Infection attack rates (IARs) stratified by 
age-groups from these states are used to arrive at disease burden estimate for the whole U.S. For 
transmission scenarios with R0=1.5 and 1.8, overall IARs (95% C.I.) are found to be 18.78% (17.3-
20.27) and 25.05% (23.11-26.99), respectively. 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the Infection Time during a Potential H7N9 Influenza Pandemic 
Outbreak 
 
 The complete article Analysis of the Infection Time from a Potential H7N9 Influenza 
Pandemic Outbreak can be found in Appendix C.  
 
3.1 Abstract 
Avian influenza viruses have been affecting human populations for a long time since the 
outbreak in the year 1580, the first recorded in history. Since then, other mutations and 
reassortments of the influenza viruses (e.g., H1N1, H3N2) have emerged causing pandemics. 
Recent emergence of A(H7N9) influenza virus in China resulted in 1307 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of human infections causing 489 deaths (37.4% fatality rate). Researchers have developed 
early estimates of some of the epidemiological parameters to characterize A(H7N9) virus in China. 
In this research we examine the distribution that characterizes the infection time from a potential 
A(H7N9) influenza pandemic outbreak using results from an agent-based (AB) simulation model. 
The AB model replicates the dynamics of contacts between susceptibles an infected individuals. 
We examined some of the common continuous probability distributions and conclude, based on 
the negative log-likelihood, that the lognormal distribution provides a good fit to characterize the 
infection time. 
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Chapter 4: Resilience as a Measure of Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza Outbreaks 
 
 The complete article Resilience as a Measure of Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza 
Outbreaks can be found in Appendix D.  
 
4.1 Abstract 
Periodic emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China in recent years has 
heightened concerns for a possible pandemic outbreak. From a public health preparedness 
standpoint, it is essential to assess the possible impact of an influenza pandemic and also the 
resilience of the affected communities, which is the ability to recover quickly from a pandemic 
outbreak. The aim of this study is to develop community resilience measures and demonstrate their 
estimation using a simulated pandemic outbreak in a region in the U.S. with a population of 1.2 
million. Three scenarios are analyzed with different combinations of virus transmissibility rates 
and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The agent-based simulation model replicates human 
interactions, spread of infection and resulting impact on human lives and society. Average 
percentage of healthy population at any point in time during a pandemic is used to quantify a 
resilience metric. Based on this new metric, it is demonstrated that resilience is improved between 
1.82 and 7.25 times when recommended NPIs are deployed.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation is a collection of manuscripts that analyzes different aspects of a relatively 
new mutation of influenza virus A(H7N9). The key aspect that is studied is the estimation of 
disease burden from a pandemic outbreak across the whole U.S. from A(H7N9) virus. The other 
aspects examined are: 1) characterization of infection time during a pandemic, and 2) development 
of a community resilience measure and examining its use in assessing preparedness in dealing with 
an influenza pandemic. Detailed conclusions from all three of the studies are presented at the end 
of each of the manuscripts, and hence will not be repeated here. In the rest of this section, we 
discuss some of the limitations as well as future extensions of the work presented in the 
dissertation. 
The version of the AB model that was used in this dissertation has limited capability in 
terms of the total number of people that it can simulate. Due to this limitation, we had to use a 
clustering and sampling approach to estimate disease burden for the whole U.S. Also, due to the 
capability limitation, we focused our attention to only urban areas and extrapolated the results to 
over all areas. This is a simplification, as it is well known that the population dynamics and 
resulting contact processes in rural areas are different from urban areas. As an extension to this 
dissertation, a graphical processing unit (GPU) based AB simulation model is being developed. 
This model is capable of simulating much wider outbreaks with higher number of people (> 100 
millions). The model also is much more granular as it incorporates added features like: specific 
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coordinates for households, businesses, and community places; local and long distances travels; 
use of antivirals and vaccines; and existing immunity. 
We estimated the best probability distribution that describes the infection from among a 
set of continuous distributions. When NPIs are deployed, infected time exhibits multi-modal 
behavior which cannot be captured by a classical continuous distribution. However, though our 
chosen distribution with estimated parameters has acceptable goodness of fit, it can be further 
improved through perhaps a mixture of distributions. It may also be prudent to classify the 
infection time data based on age groups. As different influenza viruses tend to have different age-
targets. 
Resilience metrics estimated in this study were found to be useful in quantifying the 
efficacies of NPI policies. This helps the decision makers to consider not only the estimate of 
disease burden but also the resilience of the community. However, future studies in this field may 
develop new metrics considering cost and other impact measures like loss of productivity. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
Aim 
Since spring 2013, periodic emergence of avian influenza A(H7N9) virus in China has heightened 
the concern for a possible pandemic outbreak, though it is believed that the virus is not yet human-
to-human transmittable. Till January 2017, A(H7N9) has resulted in 918 laboratory-confirmed 
cases of human infections causing 359 deaths. The aim of this paper is to present disease burden 
estimates from a potential A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak spread over all 50 contiguous states of the 
U.S. with a total population of 307 million.  
Method 
The method uses a machine learning technique to divide 50 states in the U.S. into a small number 
of clusters based on urban population size and density. Thereafter, for a few selected states in each 
cluster, the method employs an agent-based (AB) model to simulate influenza pandemic outbreaks. 
The model uses demographic data published by U.S. Census bureau, and epidemiological data 
from published research reports on H7N9. A few selected non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) 
were applied on the outbreaks. For two different epidemiological scenarios with 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5 and 1.8,  
infection attack rates (IAR) and the number of deaths were estimated.  
Results 
Overall IARs (95% C.I.) for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5 and 1.8 were found to be 18.78% (17.3 – 20.27) and 25.05% 
(23.11 – 26.99), respectively. The corresponding number of deaths (95% C.I.), in millions, were 
estimated to be 23.9 (22.0 – 25.8) and 31.9 (29.4 – 34.6).    
Conclusions 
Our results represent a worst-case scenario where no antivirals or vaccines are administered and 
the pandemic is considered to have spread over the whole contiguous territory of the U.S. The 
results are also likely to be somewhat higher due to the fact that only dense urban regions (around 
3% of the geographic area) with approximately 81% of the population were used for simulating 
sample outbreaks. Outcomes from these simulations were extrapolated over the remaining 19% of 
the population spread sparsely over 97% of the area. Furthermore, the full extent of possible NPIs, 
if deployed, could also have lowered the estimates. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A(H7N9) has infected humans in China in three waves, spring 2013, winter  2013-14, and winter 
2014-15. The fourth wave is currently in progress. As of January 2017, a total of 918 laboratory-
confirmed cases of A(H7N9) infections have been recorded in China causing 359 deaths [1]. 
Figure 1 depicts the outbreak locations which are in relatively densely populated regions with over 
54% of China’s population. The reported average ages of those infected in the first three waves 
are 61, 57, and 56, respectively [2]. However, the relative high age of those infected has not been  
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attributed as an epidemiological characteristic of A(H7N9). Instead, it is conjectured to be a 
function of the higher level of exposure to poultry for elderly. Though most of the infections are 
known to be isolated cases, exceptions were noted where human-to-human transmission may have 
occurred. For example, there were at least sixteen clusters of three infected family members and 
one cluster of two infected family members [3]. However, there is still lack of sustained evidence 
of human-to-human transmission [1].  
 
 
Fig. 1.   Extent and impact of waves of A(H7N9) outbreaks in China 
 
Experts fear that A(H7N9) could become human-to-human transmittable and cause a pandemic. 
Hence, from a public health preparedness standpoint, it is essential to assess the possible impact 
(disease burden) of a A(H7N9) pandemic. A significant fear of a H5N1 pandemic outbreak existed 
during the years 2003-2009, when the virus infected a total of 468 people with 282 deaths in 15 
countries [4]. These numbers were updated in 2015 to 844 infected and 449 deaths [5]. Research 
papers published in 2005 [6] and 2006 [7] critically examined the impact of potential H5N1 
outbreaks. The disease burden in the U.S. from the H1N1/09 outbreak has been estimated to be 
60.8 million infections and 12,469 deaths [8]. 
 
Examinations of A(H7N9) infections [9–15]  present some of the epidemiological parameters for 
the virus. A comparison of A(H7N9) parameters, with those for H5N1 is shown in Table I [16]. 
A(H7N9) is highly pathogenic both in humans and birds but infected poultry remain asymptomatic 
and do not die. 
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The objective of this paper is to present an estimate of the disease burden of a potential A(H7N9) 
influenza pandemic in the U.S. The estimate is obtained using our agent-based simulation model 
which were published in previous versions [17–20]. A systematic review of the pandemic 
simulation models can be found in [21]. We implemented the AB model separately in a few 
selected states representing the U.S. and used their results to estimate burden on U.S. The AB 
model is limited to simulating up to five million people per run. This is due to limited memory 
capacity in desktop computers and how memory is utilized by the AB model. The simulation model 
replicates the dynamics of pandemic outbreak  by incorporating the demographic information 
(households, schools, workplaces, and communities), human behavior (contacts, compliance to 
quarantine and other public health measures, and travel), epidemiological parameters of the virus 
(force of infection, incubation and latent periods, basic reproduction number (R0), and fatality 
rate), and non-pharmaceutical interventions. The AB model considers household member 
compositions (age, sex, work, parental status), distance between individuals and their daily 
movements, contact processes, infection process, and disease natural history. 
 
 
 
In order to select the representative states to simulate A(H7N9) outbreak, we first classified 50 
states into clusters using urban population size and density as predictors. These are highly 
correlated to the spread of influenza virus. The classification technique yielded a number of 
clustering alternatives (Figure 2), of which we selected the 3-cluster alternative. Clusters 1 to 3 
contained states in an increasing order of predictor value combinations. Figure 3 depicts the cluster 
designation for the states. We selected New Mexico from cluster 1, Colorado and Oregon from 
cluster 2, and California and New York from cluster 3. Selection of these five states was influenced 
by a recent paper [22] that presents disease burden estimates for seasonal influenza.  
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Fig. 2. Dendrogram with the list of states contained within three clusters 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Map of 48 states of U.S. designated to clusters 1(white), 2(gray), 3(black). States marked 
with lines were selected for outbreak simulation. Not shown in the figure are Alaska (cluster 1) 
and Hawaii (cluster 2). 
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For California and New York with urban population sizes greater than five million, we selected a 
number of urban counties within each state with a cumulative population less than or equal to five 
million. While for Colorado, Oregon, and New Mexico we simulated their total urban population, 
each less than 5 million. Our focus on urban population was guided by the fact that approximately 
81% of the population of the selected states reside in dense urban regions constituting on average 
3.4% of the land area. We used latest census data to extract information on households, 
workplaces, and schools. We implemented a non-pharmaceutical intervention (NPI) strategy 
comprising measures like isolation, quarantine, school and workplace closures. Pharmaceutical 
interventions (vaccines and antivirals) were not considered.  
 
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the clustering technique, the 
AB simulation model and its main features, and the parameter estimation method from stratified 
data. Section 3 presents validation of our AB model. Section 4 presents model parameter values. 
Results and conclusions are presented in Section 5 and 6, respectively. 
 
II. METHODS 
A. Clustering Method 
We used a hierarchical clustering method. Predictor values were first normalized by subtracting 
from each the corresponding mean and dividing by the corresponding standard deviation. The 
method begins by assigning each state to a separate cluster (50 clusters at start). Then it calculates 
the Euclidean distances between the predictor vectors (size, density) of all cluster pairs. Identifies 
the cluster pair with the smallest distance and combines them into one cluster. This reduces the 
number of original clusters by one, and for the combined cluster, its predictor vector is assigned 
as the centroid of the predictor vectors of the two constituent clusters. At the next step, the 
distances between the clusters are updated, and the process repeats until all clusters are combined 
into one single cluster. A line diagram (called, dendrogram) is then used in selecting an acceptable 
number of clusters considering a desired level of similarity within each cluster. We implemented 
the clustering method by first using preprocess function within the Caret package of R library to 
normalize the data. Thereafter, we used the predict, dist, and hclust functions within the stats 
package of R library for the remaining steps of the method. R is a free and open source language 
and environment for statistical analysis (https://cran.r-project.org/). 
 
B. AB Simulation Model 
We updated an existing AB model [17–19] by incorporating the method for estimating force of 
infection found in [6]. The model mimics the contact process and tracks each individual in an 
outbreak region using their scheduled hourly movements within the mixing groups: households, 
places (schools and workplaces), and communities. The model begins by generating the mixing 
groups and the individuals according to the census and demographic data. Each individual is 
assigned a household, a place, and a subset of the community locations to visit daily. At the end  
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of each day, the model estimates the force of infection for each susceptible individual. The force 
of infection is then used to determine if an individual becomes infected. AB model components 
are described next. 
 
B1. Disease Natural History 
An infected individual simultaneously begins a latency and an incubation period (based on 
parameters given in Table I). The individual displays symptoms (unless asymptomatic) at the end 
of the incubation period, and becomes infectious after the latent period is complete. Following the 
infectiousness period, an infected either recovers or dies. Recovered becomes immune. As no 
estimate of the proportion of asymptomatic cases is reported for A(H7N9) so far, we assumed it to 
be 50% as considered in previous studies [6]. The duration of infectiousness for each case is 
calculated using a lognormal random generator with parameters given in Table VI. 
 
B2. Infection Model 
An individual i is considered to accumulate force of infection 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 in his/her home, in places, and in 
community locations. It is calculated as in [6]: 
𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = � 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽ℎ𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘)𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘[1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘(𝜔𝜔 − 1)]𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘|ℎ𝑘𝑘=ℎ𝑖𝑖                                                + � 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘)𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘�1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘(𝜔𝜔𝜓𝜓𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘) − 1)�
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘|𝑙𝑙𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗=𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗+  ∑ 𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘𝜍𝜍(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖)𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝜅𝜅(𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏𝑘𝑘)𝜌𝜌𝑘𝑘𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘)[1 + 𝐶𝐶𝑘𝑘(𝜔𝜔 − 1)]𝑘𝑘
∑ 𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘)𝑘𝑘  
 (1) 
The first component in (1) expresses the force experienced by susceptible individual i at home 
from other infected household members k. The second component captures the force experienced 
at places (schools and workplaces) when a susceptible i is in the same place as infected k. The third 
component considers all infected members of the community as a function of their distances from 
the susceptible i. The parameters of (1) are defined in Table II. 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 is calculated at the end of each 
day for all susceptible i and the probability of infection is obtained as 1 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒−𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖. It is assumed 
that if not infected by the end of a day, 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  is reset to zero. 
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B3. Non-Pharmaceutical Intervention 
We considered isolation of symptomatic infected individuals at home for a specific duration with 
isolation compliance of 53% for adult workers and 57.5% for non-workers [19]. A compliant 
infected individual is assumed to stay home all day. We consider an isolation threshold of one day 
(that is, on average an individual diagnosed with infection does not begin isolation until the day 
after) and isolation duration of seven days, based on the disease natural history.  
 
We also considered household quarantine that restricts the movement of susceptible household 
members when one or more members are infected. Household quarantine parameters were 
considered same as for individual isolation. Children were assumed to fully comply with isolation. 
A partial school closure approach closed a classroom when a threshold of newly infected children 
in the classroom was reached. A threshold for the number of closed classrooms was used to close 
a school. 
 
We used a threshold value of one for both the classroom closure and school closure and closure of 
21 days. Workplace closure strategy was similar to that of school closure where each  
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department/group was treated like a classroom. The thresholds were: three cases to close a 
department, 30% of the departments closed to close a workplace, and seven days for closure 
duration. 
 
C. Disease Burden (IAR) Calculation from Estimates Stratified by Cluster and Age-Groups 
We first calculated the mean and C.I. of the IAR, for all three age-groups (indexed by a) in all 
sampled states (indexed by i) within each cluster (indexed by j), using replicated results of the AB 
simulation model. The 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. was calculated as ?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ± 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼 2� ,𝑛𝑛−1 𝑠𝑠√𝑛𝑛 , where ?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎  denotes 
the mean IAR, n represents the number of simulation replicates, and s represents the standard 
deviation of the replicated estimates. Mean IAR values for the clusters were obtained by combining 
the values of ?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎  into ?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 using the expression below [23]. 
?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎 = 1
𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎 ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎 ?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗
𝑖𝑖=1 ,                                                       (2) 
where Sj denotes the total number of selected states that were simulated within cluster j, and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎  
represents the size of the urban population in state i within cluster j for age-group a. Note that 
𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎 = ∑ 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖=1  is the total urban population for the selected states in cluster j for age-group a. The 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. on the IAR estimate for each age group within a cluster was obtained as ?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ±
𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼
2� ,𝑛𝑛−1 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎√𝑛𝑛 . The pooled standard deviation 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 was calculated from the replicated estimates of IAR 
for each selected state within a cluster as the square root of �(𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗1𝑎𝑎2 + ⋯+ (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎2�/[𝑘𝑘(𝑛𝑛 − 1)], where k is the number of selected states in cluster j, n is the number of simulation 
replicates, and 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎  is the standard deviation of replicated estimates for age-group a in state k within 
cluster j. Hereafter, we combined the IAR estimates from all clusters into one value for each age-
group using 
?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎 = 1
𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎
∑ 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶
𝑗𝑗=1 ,                                                      (3) 
where C denotes the number of clusters, 𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 denotes the total population of all the states in cluster 
j in age-group a, and 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 denotes the total population in the country in age-group a. It may be noted 
that the estimate ?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎 has a variance 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎 from two sources of variability: 1) due to sampling: a sample 
population from each cluster is used to estimate ?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎, which is then considered to hold good for the 
whole cluster population, 2) due to simulation based estimation: ?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎’s are obtained from ?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 , which 
are estimated from simulation model with inherent variability. It can be argued that these two 
sources of variability are independent. We obtained the variance due to sampling 𝑉𝑉1𝑎𝑎 as follows 
[24], 
𝑉𝑉1
𝑎𝑎 = 1(𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎)2 ∑ �𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�2 �𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎−𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 �𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗=1 �𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�1−𝑝𝑝�𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎�𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎−1 �.                                              (4) 
The variance due to simulation 𝑉𝑉2𝑎𝑎 was obtained as the pooled variance from the variance estimates 
(𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎) of the three clusters as 𝑉𝑉2𝑎𝑎 = �((𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠1𝑎𝑎2 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠2𝑎𝑎2 + (𝑛𝑛 − 1)𝑠𝑠3𝑎𝑎2�/[3(𝑛𝑛 − 1)], where  
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n is number of simulation replicates per cluster. A 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)% C.I. was calculated as ?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎 ±
𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼
2� ,𝑛𝑛−1�𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎 𝑛𝑛�  . Finally, we obtained a single estimate of IAR (?̂?𝑒) for the whole U.S. across all 
age-groups 𝑎𝑎 𝜖𝜖{1,2, … , 𝐿𝐿} using (3) and substituting in the equation 𝑁𝑁,𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 and ?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎 for 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 ,𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 and 
?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗
𝑎𝑎, respectively, and summing over a = 1 through L. The variance V on the overall IAR estimate 
was obtained by pooling variance values 𝑉𝑉𝑎𝑎 from the three age-groups. A 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼)%  C.I. was 
calculated as ?̂?𝑒 ± 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼
2� ,𝑛𝑛−1�𝑉𝑉 𝑛𝑛�  . 
 
III. MODEL VALIDATION 
We validated our model by replicating a H5N1 outbreak study for Southeast Asia [6]. The study 
considered 85 million people. We considered a subset of people (5M) and proportionately adjusted 
down the number of households, schools, workplaces, and community locations. As in [6] we 
considered two different 𝑅𝑅0 (1.5 and 1.8) values and ran ten replicates for each. For 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5, the 
average IAR (𝑋𝑋�) is 34.58% with a standard deviation (s) of 5.24, and 95% C.I. of [30.83 - 38.33]. 
The IAR reported in [6] for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.5 is 33%, which is within our C.I. Our corresponding values 
for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.8 are 55.7%, 8.16, and [49.86 - 61.54], respectively. The IAR reported in [6] is 50%. 
 
IV. DISEASE BURDEN ESTIMATION: PRELIMINARIES 
The AB simulation model was implemented considering only the urbanized regions of the five 
selected states. Table III shows the population sizes and their distribution between urban and rural 
regions. Urban population of Colorado, New Mexico, and Oregon are below the 5 million 
threshold of our AB model capacity. Hence, for these states, the AB model used total urban 
population as sample sizes. For example, Colorado was simulated using the total urban population 
of 4.62M as the sample size comprising 1.19M for ages ≤ 19, 2.83M for ages 20 –  64, and 0.59M 
for ages 65 and above (see Table IV). For California and New York, we adopted a proportional 
sampling approach. For example, California has 9.7M people for age-group ≤ 19 years and 22.4M 
and 4.74M for age-groups 20 – 64 years and ≥ 65 years, respectively. The AB model used the 
family composition features from the U.S. census to randomly generate a total of (9.7/36.8)x5M 
children, (22.4/36.8)x5M adults up to age 64, and (4.74/36.8)x5M adults 65 and above. Also using 
census data, the model first creates a proportional number of households in a region and then 
populates each household following the average proportion of children and adults in various age-
groups in U.S. families as presented in Table V. Thereafter, the model generates the places (schools 
and workplaces) using census data in [24] and [25], and randomly assigns each individual to a 
place based on the age-group. Beyond households and places, the model also considers movements 
of the individuals in the community within the state for daily errands. Same proportions given in 
Table V are used for all five selected states. 
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The AB model initiated each outbreak by introducing six infected individuals. The parameter 
values used to calculate 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 using (1) are shown on Table VI (for 𝑅𝑅0 = 1.8). To calculate the third 
component of 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖, we assumed, for simplicity, that each day an individual (susceptible or infected) 
travel within or outside of their county of residence for errand or leisure. Distance 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘 was 
obtained as the distance (in kilometers) between the center of the county locations for susceptible 
i and infected k. Similar parameters were also used in [26]. 
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The AB simulation model gives us as outcome the mean IAR values (?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎 ) displayed on Table IV. 
We used the estimated values of ?̂?𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎  and 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎  to estimate ?̂?𝑒𝑗𝑗𝑎𝑎, using (2), IAR per age-group within a 
cluster. These values were then combined to obtain estimate of IAR for each age-group (?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎) in the 
whole U.S. Finally, IAR values for all age-groups were combined to obtain the overall IAR 
estimate (?̂?𝑒).  
 
V. DISEASE BURDEN ESTIMATION: RESULTS 
Ten replicates of independent simulation runs were made for each of the five selected states from 
three density clusters. We collected age-stratified output data (IAR). Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the 
IARs and their C.I.s, which can be seem to be generally higher for states/clusters with higher 
population density.  
 
The IARs for the five states were then used to calculate IARs for the corresponding clusters. Tables 
VII and VIII show IARs and number of infected cases per age-group within each cluster combined. 
IAR estimates across all clusters within the age-groups (?̂?𝑒𝑎𝑎 in (3)) and across all age-groups (?̂?𝑒), 
and the number of fatalities are shown in Table IX.  
 
The IAR estimates were compared with IAR estimates for other viruses as shown in Table X. 
Simulation-based estimates of IAR for both H5N1 and A(H7N9) were found to be much lower 
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than the field estimate for H1N1/2009. We conjecture that the lower IAR estimates are due to 
lower estimates of the force of infection, for which the parameters were estimated from only 
animal-to-human transmittable cases of outbreaks. 
 
 
Fig. 4. C.I. for infection attack rates for age-group ≤ 19yrs 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. C.I. for infection attack rates for age-group 20 – 64 yrs 
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Fig. 6. C.I. for infection attack rates for age-group 65+ yrs 
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VI DISCUSSION 
Our paper is the first to estimate disease burden from A(H7N9) pandemic outbreak across the 
whole U.S., hence we could not directly compare our results with other A(H7N9) study. The 
disease parameter estimates used in our model were adopted from the recent reports on 
epidemiological studies of A(H7N9) [2, 9, 16, 29]. Other models (e.g., using differential equations) 
have been used to analyze A(H7N9) [28 – 30]. These models do not have the level of granularity 
of agent-based simulation models which can consider each individual in the population, their  
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household and age distribution, workplaces, schools and communities, daily schedule of activities, 
and travel behavior. However, such granularity comes with the cost of computation and memory 
usage, which resulted our model capacity to be limited to 5 million people per simulation run. We 
note that the limit can be increased with better computing hardware and more efficient usage of 
memory. Considering the five states that were selected for simulation, the 5 million limit only 
applied to California and New York. For the other three states, simulations were run for the whole 
urban population as the total population for each of these states are below 5 million. For California 
and New York, we used an agent-based proportional sampling approach to select up to 5 million 
individuals from the urban areas.  
 
 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A recent paper in June 2016 [2] presented a comprehensive analysis of the laboratory-confirmed 
cases of A(H7N9) infection in mainland China. It presented renewed estimates for incubation 
period, fatality risk, hospital admission to death/discharge, median age, and poultry exposure. We 
note, however, that the parameter estimates that we used from an earlier study [16] do not differ 
significantly from those presented in [2]. Though it appears from the published data that A(H7N9) 
affects more people of higher age group, it is likely a function of the very high level of poultry 
exposure (≥ 74% [16]) for the older age group. Our AB model does not incorporate any age-
dependent factor for calculating probability of infection. However, our model does consider age-
based contact process, which in turn affects the infection probability.  
 
We simulated outbreaks only in urban areas and extrapolated the results to the population in the 
remaining (rural) areas. Urban areas constitute on average 3.4% of the geographic area and 
approximately 81% of the population [27]. Hence, the disease burden estimates, for each state, 
cluster, age-group as presented here, are likely to be upper bounds, as the population in rural areas 
are likely to be less affected. Also, applications of vaccines and antivirals were not considered in 
our AB model, which increased the number of susceptible and the intensity of infection, 
respectively. Furthermore, the disease burden estimates could have been lowered by application 
of the full extent of NPIs. 
Our AB simulation model has the following notable limitations. It does not assign specific 
geographic locations for the households, places, and communities. As a result, we had to use 
estimated values for the distance between susceptible and infected �𝑓𝑓(𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘� in equation (1)) in 
calculating the force of infection. Use of antivirals could have reduced the profile of infectiousness 
with a lower peak and shorter duration reducing the virus spread and the corresponding IAR. Also, 
we did not consider pre-existing immunity for any age-group in the population. 
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Appendix C: Resilience as a Measure of Preparedness for Pandemic Influenza Outbreaks 
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